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Reforming birth registration law in England and Wales? 
Julie McCandless 
 
London School of Economics, London, UK 
E-mail address: j.c.mccandless@lse.ac.uk. 
 
Abstract The Law Commission of England and Wales is considering what its 13
th
 Programme of Law 
Reform should address. During the consultation process, a project on birth registration law has been 
mooted. This is a very welcome proposal given that civil birth registration in England and Wales is a 
compulsory procedure that not only finds its roots in the early Victorian era, but also remains very 
similar, at least in terms of form and the information that is recorded. I first use two recent legal 
challenges to illustrate why the current system is coming under increasing pressure. I further use 
these examples to caution against a law reform agenda that is narrowly focused on the precise 
information recorded, without a preliminary and wider examination of what the role and purpose of 
birth registration is, and should be, in society. I argue that this needs to be addressed before the 
state can justify the parameters of the information recorded. I then use an outline of historical 
reforms relating to the registration of births outside of marriage to highlight the normative two-
parent family model that underpins the birth registration system. I argue that legal reform must be 
cognizant of the tenacity of this normative family model, particularly in relation to reform proposals 
surrounding donor conception and the annotation of birth certificates. Finally, I draw attention to 
wider developments in family law that cast birth registration as a social policy tool for the facilitation 
of parent Wchild relationships, particularly unmarried fathers.  
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The Law Commission of England and Wales is currently considering what its 13
th
 Programme of Law 
Reform should address. During the consultation process, a project on birth registration law and 
certificates has been mooted. This is a very welcome proposal. Civil birth registration in England and 
Wales is a compulsory procedure that not only finds its roots in the early Victorian era, but also 
remains very similar, at least in terms of form and the information that is recorded. In this short 















under increasing pressure. I further use these examples to caution against a law reform agenda that 
is narrowly focused on the precise information recorded on a birth certificate, particularly in relation 
to parenthood. This is not to suggest that the information recorded should not be reconsidered, but 
rather that the scope of a law reform project on birth registration needs to be wider given the 
normative family model which underpins the system.  
I then draw particular attention to the wider family law and policy context within which birth 
registration operates, and ask what this means in relation to the information recorded. I outline 
reforms relating to the registration of births outside of marriage to demonstrate that, while 
historical changes could be interpreted as being a bit haphazard, they have, in fact, always been 
informed by the normative two-parent family model. I argue that legal reform cannot ignore this 
tenacious normative dimension, given the extent to which it shapes how the familial information on 
a birth certificate is understood. I also point to changes in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and 
the Welfare Reform Act 2009  W relating to the joint birth registration of births outside of marriage  W 
to show how birth registration has been conceptualized in recent times by the state as a social policy 
tool that facilitates a parent Wchild relationship. I argue that this imbues birth registration with even 
further significance in terms ŽĨ ‘ƚĞǆƚƵĂůůǇŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚ ?ƐƚĂƚĞĐƌĂĨƚ ?Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012), for it 
means that regisƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ  ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? >ĞŐĂů ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ
cognizĂŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƌŽůĞŽĨďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇĂŶĚ ‘ƉĂƉĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝze and 
determine family practices and behaviour. I conclude that a law reform process underpinned by 
these wider considerations should be very much welcomed as a way of progressively considering 
what role this compulsory civil registration procedure can and should play in contemporary and 
future society.  
 
<A>Challenging times for birth registration 
It has been almost a decade since the Joint Committee scrutinizing the Human Tissues and Embryos 
(Draft) Bill (2007) recommended that, 'as a matter of urgency', the Government give consideration 
to rights that may be implicated in state authorities holding personal information  W namely details of 
gamete donors  W and the information that appears on birth certificates [House of Lords and House 
of Commons Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007: 276]. No government 
has responded to this recommendation. This is perhaps not surprising as, while donor conception is 
not uncommon, it affects only a relatively small proportion of the population.
1
 However, the 
                                                          
1
 According to the Human FertilisĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵďƌǇŽůŽŐǇ ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ůŝǀĞ ďŝƌƚŚ ƌĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ
fertility clinics in 2013 were as follows: 589 following in-vitro fertilization (IVF) with donated sperm; 597 















existence of a similar minority demographic represented by mother-only registered births (around 
7% of births registered each year; Wallbank, 2009: 1) did not prevent the enactment of quite 
considerable reforms in relation to the compulsory joint registration of births outside of marriage in 
the Welfare Reform Act 2009 (Schedule 6; on the detail of the reforms, see below). However, the 
fact that these reforms have never been implemented points to a further  W arguably more likely  W 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇƚŚĞ:ŽŝŶƚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĚƵƐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŽƌĞĨorm the law 
relating to birth registration and certificates is a complex task. The interplay between public and 
private information is politically sensitive, and the myriad uses for a birth certificate  W including 
passport application, genealogical research, application for school entrance and local authority 
services
2
   W makes it difficult to determine the most obvious government department for such an 
undertaking. The Law Commission, as a non-political entity, is therefore well placed to start 
considering how this complex area of law might be reformed.
3
 
In relation to the scope of a possible law reform project, I was very pleased to see the Law 
Commission cast this in wider terms than the Joint Committee recommendation. Any attempt to 
reform this one area of birth registration law is likely to prove unsatisfactory, given that the issue of 
whether birth certificates should indicate that a person is donor-conceived and/or include the 
name(s) of the gamete provider(s) continues to prove highly controversial and often polarized. In my 
view, this stems not only from different values being placed on genetic relationships, but also from 
different understandings of the purpose of birth registration.  
To say this is not to suggest that the issue should not be included in a law reform 
programme, particularly in light of the depth of feeling that it evokes. However, two recent legal 
challenges signal that a much wider review is warranted. The first of these cases appears, on the 
surface, ƚŽĨŝƚĐůŽƐĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ:ŽŝŶƚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? /Ŷ  ? ?, Emma Cresswell had her birth 
certificate re-issued without the name of the man originally recorded as her father, who she had 
assumed was her biological father. Her legal action followed an argument whereby he disclosed that 
she and her two brothers had been conceived through sperm donation (Crossley, 2014; Rowley, 
2014). She was 19 when this argument took place and she campaigned for almost 6 years to have 
her birth certificate re-issued. In media interviews, Emma Creswell has indicated that she is now part 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
detail the number of live births following donated embryo transfer, nor do they detail donor insemination 
births that take place in a non-clinical setting. 
2
 For example, in Torfaen County Council in Wales, residents applying for the nappy collection service as part 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨŽƌƚŶŝŐŚƚůǇ ǁĂƐƚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŵƵƐƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ĐŽƉǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŚŝůĚ ?ƌĞŶ ? ?Ɛ ďŝƌƚŚ ĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ 
[http://www.torfaen.gov.uk/en/RubbishAndRecycling/Householdwaste-domesticbins/YellowBag/Yellow-
Bag.aspx (last accessed 8 May 2017)]. 
3
 Note that the Law Commission requires confirmation from a government department that it has a 'serious 
intention' to take law reform forward before it can include a project in its programme. At this stage, we can 
only speculate on whether the Law Commission have mooted a project on birth registration law in their 13
th
 















of a wider campaign group that wants birth certificates to record that a person was donor-conceived 
(Crossley, 2014; Rowley, 2014). However, her specific legal campaign was never going to achieve 
that, at least not directly.
4
 This allows us to interpret her campaign as being about a wider issue, 
which is the extent to which people see  W and want to see  W their birth certificate reflect their lived 
familial experience. Emma did not have a close relationship with the man recorded as her father, 
having had little contact with him for most of her childhood (Crossley, 2014; Rowley, 2014). While 
her campaign was clearly prompted by finding out that she did not share a genetic relationship with 
him, the context of their relationship may also have been a motivating factor. We should therefore 
be cautious about reading her legal challenge in a reductive way, not least because it taps into a 
growing dissatisfaction with the prescriptive nature of what is recorded on birth  W and other  W 
certificates in contexts whereby individuals feel that their subjective experience and lived realities 
ĂƌĞ  ‘ŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ, or they seek official recognition of a life event.5 While donor 
conception and other collaborative
6
 reproductive practices such as surrogacy seem to present the 
most direct challenges to the purpose and form of birth registration and certificates, my second case 
example demonstrates that challenging encounters with the current birth registration system are 
much wider in scope. 
In a recent High Court case, a trans woman known as JK challenged the legal requirement 
ƚŚĂƚƐŚĞďĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŽŶŚĞƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐďŝƌƚŚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞƐ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƐĞůĨ-identifying and living 
her life as a woman, in the absence of a gender recognition certificate  W which takes some time to 
acquire (see further Grabham, 2010)  W JK was legally regarded as male, as per her original birth 
certificate {JK v Register General for England and Wales [2015] EWHC 990 (Admin)}.
7
 To complicate 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?:< ?ƐŵĂůĞŶĂŵĞǁĂƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶŚĞƌĨŝƌƐƚĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐďŝƌƚŚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞŚĞƌĨĞŵĂůĞ
ŶĂŵĞ ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ŽŶ ŚĞƌ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ?Finally, while Emma Cresswell was conceived through 
clinically assisted ŵĞĂŶƐ ?:< ?ƐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶǁĞƌĞconceived through sexual intercourse with her partner 
before JK commenced female hormonal treatment. :< ?ƐĐĂƐĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ
                                                          
4
 /ƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ůĞŐĂů ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ:ŽĂŶŶĂ ZŽƐĞ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ĐĂƐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ
donor anonymity policy (Rose v Secretary of State for Health and the HFEA [2002] EWHC 1593), which more 
directly challenged state obligations relating to the management of personal data. 
5
 Examples beyond donor conception and legal parenthood include campaigns by intersex and transgender 
persons for more responsive gender recognition (Cooper and Renz, 2016: 484); campaigns for death 
certificates to be replaced by birth certificates following a stillbirth (Sanger, 2010); and campaigns for 
certificates registering the early pregnancy loss of a miscarriage (Pearlman and Foster, 2015). 
6
 / ƵƐĞ ƚŚŝƐ ƚĞƌŵ ƚŽ ĚĞŶŽƚĞ ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƚǁŽ ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ  ‘ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚĞ ? ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĐŚŝůĚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?
sometimes with the joint intention of raising the child together.  
7
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the contested relationship between sex and gender, beyond 
ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚďŝƌƚŚƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  ‘ƐĞǆ ?ĂƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ  ‘ŵĂůĞ ?Žƌ  ‘ĨĞŵĂůĞ ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ
ĂůƐŽďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŽĨ ‘ƐĞǆ ?ƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ŐĞŶĚĞƌƌĞ-ĂƐƐŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ?
in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (see further Cowan, 2005). On the possibility of eliminating the role of 















challenges to the birth registration system beyond assisted reproduction. It also highlights the 
challenging interplay of prescriptively recorded details, with the more fluid reality of gender identity, 
family connections and naming practices; or at least the difficulties presented by a record that 
remains fixed in time, but which must be used throughout the life-course. Birth registration also 
records places, occupations, dates and adult legal relationships, none of which are beyond 
contestation.  
Any standardized written record of vital events will inevitably flatten subjectivities and the 
richness of an indiǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ personal narrative. However, what these two cases demonstrate is that 
individuals are increasingly prepared to challenge the birth registration system when they regard the 
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƐ ‘ŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ? ?For both Emma Cresswell and JK, this was, in part, motivated 
by the fact that other people see birth certificates for a wide variety of reasons, and thus have 
access to the information recorded. :< ?ƐĐĂƐĞĂůƐŽĐĂŵĞĂďŽƵƚƋƵŝƚĞƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ birth registration 
was not straightforward for her family. While cases like JK ?Ɛ may seem exceptional in the context of 
an administrative procedure that works for most people, this does not mean that they are 
unimportant, for not only do they highlight the particular difficulties and injustices for the individuals 
involved, but they also illuminate wider problems with law and a compulsory civil procedure such as 
birth registration.   
Thinking about how birth registration law could and should be reformed is undoubtedly a 
complex task. In its consultation, the Law Commission asked a number of questions relating to the 
specifics of the information that is recorded on a birth certificate. These are all important questions 
to be addressed. However, the Commission also posed two more principled questions: What is the 
purpose of a birth certificate? For whose benefit is the record kept? While it would be naïve to think 
that we could completely future-proof how birth registration comes to be understood in society, 
effective legal reform must be underpinned by a principled consideration of its role and purpose in 
contemporary society, for only then can we determine and justify the parameters of the information 
that should be recorded. By addressing questions such as these, the Law Commission would be 
making a good start in instigating a durable  W as opposed to piecemeal  W law reform process of what 
is essentially an early Victorian system. It is to the history of birth registration and reforms relating to 
the registration of births outside of marriage that I now turn. 
 
<A>Birth registration law and historic reform 
There has been a centralized system of civil birth registration in England and Wales
8
 since 1837, 
following the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836 (the 1836 Act) (see further Higgs, 2004; 
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Probert, 2011). The Births and Deaths Registration Act 1874 (the 1874 Act) made the registration of 
ďŝƌƚŚƐ ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŽƌǇ ďǇ ƉůĂĐŝŶŐ Ă ůĞŐĂů ĚƵƚǇŽŶ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂŶƚƐ ? ƚŽ ŶŽƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂůZĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌ ŽĨĂ
birth.
9
 The current law governing birth registration is the 60-year-old Births and Deaths Registration 
Act 1953 (the 1953 Act), which  W rather quietly  W celebrated its diamond jubilee around the same 
time as Queen Elizabeth II. This legislation has seen little by way of reform, and in comparing my 
birth certificate with that of my (almost sexagenarian) mother, there is very little difference in the 
information recorded  W ŵǇŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘ƵƐƵĂůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ǁĂƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ on my birth certificate, while her 
ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛaddress was recorded on hers  W not least because I was born before 1986 which is when the 
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽďĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ?10 The main amendments to the 
1953 Act relate to the incorpoƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ĨĞŵĂůĞƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĞŶĂĐƚĞĚďǇ the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, and a multiplication of the documentation that can be 
provided by an unmarried father when he cannot ĂƚƚĞŶĚŝŶƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŽƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌŚŝƐĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ birth with 
the mother (see Children Act 1989). However, other than permitting two female parents to be 
named on the birth certificate, the information recorded has remained fairly constant; to include a 
space for the ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ  ‘ŵĂŝĚĞŶŶĂŵĞ ?if different from her surname following civil partnership or 
marriage to her female partner, as has been traditional for heterosexual couples. 
 When viewed in this light, it is easy to see the birth registration system as rather rigid and 
failing to keep up with modern family life; to a large extent, this is true. However, a brief historical 
examination of how the system has been reformed in relation to births outside of marriage provides 
examples of the civil birth system being remoulded in response to changing societal mores. The 
introduction of civil birth registration has its roots in a local system of parish registration introduced 
by Thomas Cromwell (see further Szreter, 2012). Although recording the religious rites of baptism, 
marriage and burial, this parish system was more concerned with recording and facilitating property 
rights and inheritance than it was with religious doctrine (Higgs, 2004). As a consequence, the 1836 
ĐƚŵĂĚĞŶŽƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐŽĨĂ ‘ƉƵƚĂƚŝǀĞĨĂƚŚĞƌ ? ?ĂƐǁŚĂƚŵĂƚƚĞƌĞĚǁĂƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂ
legitimate line of descent.
11
 However, the 1874 Act introduced provisions to record ƚŚĞ ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
name if he attended to register the birth with the mother. In the 1953 Act, this extended to also 
being recorded without attending in person, so long as some form of legal paperwork  W such as a 
statutory declaration and, later, a parental responsibility agreement or order under the Children Act 
1989  W was submitted by the mother. These changes, in part, provided some sort of state 
                                                          
9
 The following people can act as an informant: mother; father; occupier of the house where a child is born; 
any person present at the birth; and a person having charge of the child.  
10
 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞĂĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŶĂŵĞĂŶĚŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶĂŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐ ?
ŶŽĚĞƚĂŝůƐĂƌĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĨŽƌĂďƌŝĚĞŽƌŐƌŽŽŵ ?ƐŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨĂƌĞĐĞŶƚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚ
Members of Parliament (https://www.change.org/p/mothers-names-should-be-on-marriage-certificates). 
11















recognition to an unmarried father who was willing to acknowledge his  ‘ŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĐŚŝůĚ(on the 
role of registration and recognition, see Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012). The Legitimacy Act 1926 
introduced a requirement ƚŽ ‘ƌĞ-register ?ĂďŝƌƚŚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚƵƐ
 ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌŝŶŐ ?the child in the eyes of the law.  
 It is difficult for persons of my generation and younger to fully appreciate the effects of an 
illegitimate birth and illegitimacy. However, these were clearly stigmatizing and severe, and in 1947, 
we arguably see an official sensitivity to these stigmatizing effects with the introduction of the 
 ‘ƐŚŽƌƚ ?ďŝƌƚŚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞ ?dŚĞƐĞĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞƐƌĞĐŽƌĚŽŶůǇƚŚĞŶĂŵĞ ?ƐĞǆ ?date and place of birth, without 
disclosing any parental details. Although the utility of the short birth certificate may be questionable 
today, given that the long birth certificate is increasingly requested for identification purposes,
12
 the 
short version has probably been very useful in the past for enabling persons to keep the 
circumstances of their family private. However, I have a different motivation for mentioning the 
short birth certificate, which is to question whether the introduction of a documentary mechanism 
that enables individuals to keep this information private is in tension with the increasing ability of 
unmarried fathers to be recorded on the birth certificate? dŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌŵĂǇďĞĂƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ‘ŶŽ ? ?
given the qualitative difference between making information available to the persons it is about, in 
contrast to the world at large. However, as with most things, I suspect there were other issues at 
play. For example, there may have been some value in having this information recorded, either for 
the purpose of statistical analysis or the provision of child maintenance. Or, the explanation could be 
something more normative, given that the registration located the child within a family unit that at 
least resembled the normative two-parent marital family.  
This explanation seems particularly significant given that the most recent legislative reforms 
to the system have further facilitated the registration of unmarried fathers by removing the need for 
ůĞŐĂů ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ ũŽŝŶƚ ďŝƌƚŚ ƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛ ŵŽƚŚĞƌ
(Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 111), and by introducing compulsory joint birth registration in all 
but a narrow range of exceptional cases (Welfare Reform Act 2009, Schedule 6). I discuss this 
normative dimension further below. For now, I want to end this historical outline by noting that the 
requirement to  ‘re-register ?ĂďŝƌƚŚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŽƌĐŝǀŝůƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?Ɛparents 
still forms part of the current legislative framework.
13
 This seems really odd in an era where we have 
abolished direct legal distinctions ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ? 
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 For example, if you were born in the UK on or after 1 January 1983, you will need your long birth certificate 
in order to apply for a first adult passport. If you were born before this date, your short birth certificate will 
suffice.  
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 Although it would, of course, be interesting to research how many parents do actually re-register their 
















From my brief exploration of reforms relating to the registration of births outside of marriage, I want 
to make four observations. The first is that where there is political will, the law in this area can of 
course be reformed, despite the complexity of the task. This should remove any notion that 
reforming what might seem for many to be an intuitive, ingrained and straightforward procedure 
would be overly difficult or confusing, and somehow not worth the effort, time or costs involved. 
The ongoing requirement to re-ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĂŶ ‘ŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ďŝƌƚŚŝƐ, by itself, a clear enough signal that 
reform of this 'old-age pensioner' of the statute books is needed, before even starting to think 
through the challenges heralded by developments in assisted and collaborative reproduction. 
The second observation is that historical reform of birth registration law could be 
interpreted as being a bit haphazard, in that different trends  W such as the registration of more 
unmarried fathers on birth certificates and the introduction of short birth certificates  W seem to 
occur along similar time trajectories. I mention this as I think it will be an observation that will be 
invoked in relation to the extent to which genetic parentage is recorded on a birth certificate. Here, 
there is potential for the increasing ability of unmarried (genetic) fathers to register their connection 
to a child to be pitched as in tension with the parenthood provisions of the Family Law Act 1987 and 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, which made explicit provision for non-genetic 
parents  W male or female  W to be registered as legal parents, with no indication on a birth certificate 
that the child was conceived through donor conception. However, this seems to be only a partial 
telling of a story, which perhaps finds its origins in the inaccurate characterization by the Warnock 
Committee of the birth register 'as a true genetic record' (Warnock, 1984: 4.21). While it is fair to say 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŽŶĂďŝƌƚŚĐĞƌƚŝĨŝĐĂƚĞŚĂǀĞŽĨƚĞŶďĞĞŶĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƚŝĐƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ
very little evidence that birth registration was ever meant to confer certainty about genetic 
parentage. While we may want to deliberate on whether a future system could or should confer this 
certainty, it would be disingenuous to start this discussion with the argument that this has always 
been the purpose of birth registration until legal changes heralded by assisted reproduction took 
place. The picture is more complex in that what the process recorded in terms of parenthood was a 
legally prescribed relationship, at birth, to the child who was being registered. While legal 
presumptions operated  W and continue to operate  W to confer parental status on certain persons 
who may have a biogenetic connection to a child, these presumptions have never guaranteed the 
presence of a genetic connection, particularly in relation to fatherhood.  
Furthermore, in terms of birth certificates not acknowledging the role of donor  W or 
otherwise assisted  W conception, comparisons are often made with adoption and parental order 















respectively. In both cases, it is obvious ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛcertificate is not an original birth 
certificate, prompting any curious individual to follow the paper trail to their original entry; this, of 
course, records the birth parents or sometimes the birth mother alone. However, these parents may 
ŽƌŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐŐĞŶĞƚŝĐ parents, so it seems odd to make this comparison. Birth parents are 
recorded because they, unlike most
14
 gamete providers, are legally responsible for the child at birth. 
To record persons with no legal connection or responsibility for the child would be a very 
fundamental and significant change to the birth registration system, and is one that demands careful 
consideration in light of the wider normative context in which birth registration operates.  
This leads to my third observation, which is that a normative narrative of family and kinship 
relations has always underpinned the birth registration system, and shaped its meaning in society. 
The information recorded by the state  W however partial and prescriptive  W is informed by the 
normative politics of family life. While the specifics of such may shift over time, the politics seem to 
remain tenaciously informed by gendered perceptions of the two-parent family model, in which 
children are deemed to have, at most, ƚǁŽ ‘ƌĞĂů ?ƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ(Fineman, 1995; McCandless and Sheldon, 
2010). To name gamete providers on a birth certificate, without first unshackling birth registration 
from this normative family model, would, I think, place legal parents who do not share a genetic 
connection with their child in a precarious legal and sociocultural position. Permitting the 
registration of more than two legal parents where three parents or more are collaboratively raising 
the child may offer one way of challenging the normative impulses that underpin birth registration. 
Indeed, some jurisdictions have already introduced this possibility (e.g. British Columbia). Research 
examining the effects of such legal reforms would be extremely useful in allowing us to reach 
conclusions on whether it is possible to unshackle birth registration from the normative two-parent 
family model, or whether it simply re-emerges in different guises. 
 Either way, it is this normative underpinning which makes it crucial that any law reform 
project starts by asking and attempting to clarify the very basic question of the actual purpose of 
birth registration; only then can we determine what information is appropriate to record. In urging 
the Law Commission to consider this preliminary question, I do not preclude the possibility that we 
might seek to change the purpose of birth registration from what it was in historical terms, or charge 
it with multiple purposes. However, we do need to be realistic about what we ask of an 
administrative procedure such as birth registration, and what legal reform can achieve in light of the 
wider sociolegal context in which the system operates. In terms of legal context, we cannot consider 
the reform of birth registration law without also considering developments in other substantive 
areas of law, such as citizenship and family law. 
                                                          
14
 It is important to acknowledge that some gamete providers may well intend to take a more active role in a 















 In my fourth observation, I restrict my comments to developments in family law, where birth 
registration has become an increasingly important social policy tool in relation to parenting. Section 
111 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 reformed the law so that voluntary joint birth 
registration conferred automatic parental responsibility to unmarried fathers (Sheldon, 2009; 
Wallbank, 2009), rather than the father having to come to a parental responsibility agreement with 
the legal mother or apply to the court for a parental responsibility order (Children Act 1989, Section 
4). The Welfare Reform Act 2009, although as yet unimplemented, makes legislative provision for 
the compulsory joint registration of all non-marital births, and amends the Children Act 1989 to 
automatically confer parental responsibility to unmarried fathers. With these recent amendments, 
birth registration is no longer regarded in family law as simply a written legal record or evidence of 
ǁŚŽĂĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐƉĂƌĞnts were at the moment of birth, but rather, as a social policy tool that should 
facilitate the parent Wchild relationship through the conferment of various parental legal rights and 
entitlements (McCandless, 2011). Whether a paper certificate can ever successfully encourage 
parent Wchild relationships remains to be seen, and we should not forget that family law also 
prescribes who can be regarded as a legal parent and thus eligible to be named on a birth certificate. 
However, these changes do make us conscious of the role and power of committing something to 
paper, and the significance of what has been described as  ‘ƚĞǆƚƵĂůůǇŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? by the 
state (Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012). This reminds us of the important role of registration, 
particularly of vital information such as births and deaths, in the politics of modern statecraft, and 
jƵƐƚĂƐƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?15 so the information recorded through processes 
of regŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ? ?
 
<A>Conclusion 
/Ŷ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ >Ăǁ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ it should review the law 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŝƌƚŚƐ ?ƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌŝƐƐƵƌĞůǇ ‘ǇĞƐ ? ?>ĞŐĂůĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵ
are increasing, and while the context of each challenge varies, what we see in common across 
different contexts is a growing significance being placed on what individuals regard as subjectively 
 ‘ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶďĞŝŶŐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ, and a desire to have signŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůŝĨĞĞǀĞŶƚƐ ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝzĞĚ ? ?dŚĞƐĞ
developments relate, in part, ƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚ ĨĂŵŝůǇŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐ
countenanced in the standardized birth registration procedures and forms, but they also relate to 
the multiple, and sometimes competing and contradictory, understandings that people have of the 
purpose of birth registration. As birth certificates are increasingly required for identification, such 
challenges are likely to increase, particularly as different forms of parenting, family life and gender 
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 &ŽƌĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ĨŝǆŝŶŐ ?ĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶĞƚŝĐƉĂƌĞŶƚŚŽŽĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨŶĞǁ















become increasingly visible and acceptable. While some may argue that legal reform in this area 
would not benefit a substantial enough number of people, such would only be true if the Law 
Commission was to cast the scope of the project in a narrow fashion. Underpinning some specific 
reform questions with a much wider consideration of the purpose of birth registration in the 
contemporary era would be an extremely useful project for wider society, with implications for 
everybody given the compulsory nature of birth registration. While there will undoubtedly be a huge 




 many of which will seem worthy of reform, how 
many will involve a compulsory procedure that has remained fairly stagnant since the early 19
th
 
century, despite significant developments in family life; understandings of gender in society; and the 
information which the state holds on individuals in other administrative, statistical, biometric and 
healthcare databases? 
 There is significant  W and really interesting  W work to be done in this area. In legal terms, the 
past decade has seen a growing body of academic scholarship on birth registration, but, like reform, 
this has been piecemeal. There is plenty of scope for more sustained considerations, particularly 
those of an empirical and comparative nature. Placing birth registration law on the legal reform 
agenda would certainly highlight registration as a serious topic for academic and other research, and 
would lead to greater societal understanding of both the purpose and meaning of this increasingly 
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